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The Missouri Supreme Court, relying on Daimler, held that general jurisdiction is appropriate only when a corporation is incorporated in the state, the corporation’s principle place of business is in the state, or when the corporation’s activities are “so substantial and of such nature as to render the corporation at home in that state.”
The Court acknowledged that: Norfolk owned 400 miles of track in Missouri; Norfolk generated $232 million in revenue in Missouri; and Norfolk employed 590 employees in Missouri. Despite acknowledging that Norfolk did “substantial and continuous business in Missouri”, the court held that it was not “so extensive and all-encompassing” as to establish personal jurisdiction, noting the above mentioned business activities accounted for only two percent of Norfolk’s total business.
Plaintiff argued that general jurisdiction was proper because Norfolk kept a registered agent in Missouri in compliance with the foreign registration requirements. The Court rejected this argument and held that Norfolk’s registration was not sufficient for general jurisdiction. Relying on the plain language of RSMo. §506.150.1(3), the Court noted that the Missouri foreign registration statute does not mention “consent to personal jurisdiction for unrelated claims, nor does it purport to provide an independent basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations that register in Missouri.” Because the statute does not mention consent to personal jurisdiction, the registration of an agent is clearly not consent to personal jurisdiction.
Finally, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that specific jurisdiction was proper simply because Norfolk had tracks in Missouri and that Norfolk’s track business was the same “type” as its business in Indiana, where the plaintiff was injured, or that FELA provided specific jurisdiction. The court notes that a corporation is not subject to specific jurisdiction just because said corporation conducts the same “type” of business in another jurisdiction. This would be analogous to allowing Ford to be sued in California for injuries sustained in Iowa, simply because they sell cars in both locations. Accordingly, the court held that because plaintiff’s injuries arose out of Norfolk’s activities in Indiana, rather than activities in Missouri, that specific jurisdiction could not be supported.
This decision comes at a time when Missouri is considering additional legislation regarding venue perfection and tort reform. While the impact of Norfolk has yet to be seen, this decision and the new legislation may give defendants more tools in the fight against venue shopping.
Click here to read the Daimler decision.